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CLAUDIA MAIENBORN
‘‘Comments are very welcome!’’ This basic attitude and the many ways
of implementing it contribute immensely to the fascination of engaging
in scientific research. I am grateful to Theoretical Linguistics for provid-
ing a public platform for this kind of scholarly exchange and I thank
all commentators for their thoughtful, stimulating, and often challenging
contributions to my target article. My response will address two main
issues that are raised by the commentaries. The first issue is shaped by a
cluster of questions relating to ontology. The second issue concerns ques-
tions of methodology pertaining in particular to the problem of judging
data.
1. How much ontology?
How much ontology do we need when doing semantics? How deep
should we delve into ontology when explicating what notions such as
‘event’ and ‘state’ actually mean? In Higginbotham’s opinion my pro-
posal of drawing an ontological distinction between eventualities (events,
processes and D(avidsonian)-states) on the one hand and the entities ex-
pressed by copular constructions and stative verbs (K(imian)-states) on
the other ventures out too far. Higginbotham advises caution in this re-
spect: ‘‘Whilst insisting that our talk of events, states, and the rest is to
be taken seriously, semantics should, in my view, be wary of embracing
more in the way of Metaphysics than appears from its own investiga-
tions internal to language’’ (p. 357). Most commentators seem to subscribe
to this view. From this perspective, and taking into account furthermore
considerations of parsimony, it is only natural that the suggestion of a
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new ontological category is confronted with a fair amount of skepticism.
I want to emphasize that I share Higginbotham’s concerns, yet my con-
clusions di¤er. In particular, I would object to his final judgment: ‘‘there
is no reason to endow the linguistic/semantic hypothesis of the E-position
with an ontological aura involving space and time, or perception’’ (pp.
357–358).
I would first like to emphasize that I am pursuing a cognitive approach
to ontology. That is, I understand ontology as the basic conceptual inven-
tory we employ for our (higher) cognitive activities. Under this view, on-
tology is not concerned with the world itself but rather with the world as
conceived and categorized by human beings; see also Dölling’s footnote
4. We should bear in mind that natural language is only one among sev-
eral sources for gaining insights into the organization of this conceptual
category system. Nevertheless language is surely the most profitable
source and – bearing in mind Higginbotham’s first quote – the one lin-
guists should primarily stick to; see also Bach’s (1989) notion of ‘‘Natural
Language Metaphysics’’.
I hope that this standpoint on the role of ontology helps clarify some of
the misunderstandings in the commentaries. The more general question of
whether linguistics/semantics should adopt such a cognitive perspective is
of course a matter of dispute. Yet, this cannot be our concern here.
With these introductory remarks in mind, we may turn now to the case
of events & co as used in the Davidsonian framework. Higginbotham
takes the core idea to be the following: ‘‘What is proposed, and was em-
phasized in Davidson’s work, is that events are things, and so to be taken
up in the same first-order terms as those employed for quantification
over, and reference to, the most ordinary objects’’ (p. 358). Again: I agree.
Yet I think that we are also obliged to ask what kind of things they are.
Does the way we speak about them indicate that ordinary events and or-
dinary objects – to take these two – are the same kind of thing, and if not,
in what respects do they di¤er? This is the background for my target arti-
cle, in which I pursued the question of whether there is su‰cient linguistic
evidence for the (Neo-)Davidsonian assumption that all (verbal) predi-
cates denote eventualities.
My line of argumentation basically involved three steps: (a) I presented
a collection of linguistic criteria according to which verbal expressions fall
into two groups; (b) this empirical basis was taken as a su‰ciently strong
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linguistic indication of an underlying ontological di¤erence and led to the
introduction of K-states besides Davidsonian eventualities; (c) I elabo-
rated the notion of K-states on the basis of further linguistic observations.
The commentators’ positions wrt these three points can be classified
coarsely as follows: Engelberg basically accepts (a) and (b) but has objec-
tions concerning (c). That is, he shares the view that the observed linguis-
tic di¤erences require an ontological solution in terms of assuming a dif-
ferent kind of entity besides eventualities. Engelberg raises a couple of
questions showing that my conception of K-states needs to be refined
and made more precise in several respects and I am very grateful for his
suggestions to this end.
Dölling, Ramchand, and (with some more reservations) Higginbotham
basically accept (a) but they reject my conclusion (b). That is, they agree
more or less that the observed linguistic di¤erences are real but they do
not see the need for assuming a new kind of entity. Rather, they suggest,
the data call for a more liberal definition of eventualities than the one I
argued for. Under this view, copular constructions and stative verbs de-
note a subtype of eventualities.
Finally, Rothstein casts doubts already on (a). That is, she rejects my
claim that there is a grammatically relevant split between the two groups
of verbal expressions both by presenting some counterevidence and by
advocating a pragmatic explanation for some of the observed ‘‘anoma-
lies’’. It is worth pointing out though that Rothstein’s view on eventual-
ities is in accordance in relevant parts with mine.
This survey of the di¤erent positions makes it clear that the David-
sonian notion of event(ualitie)s, which has become such a familiar, ‘‘all-
purpose’’ linguistic instrument over the past decades, is anything but
self-explanatory. To draw attention to some of the incongruities lurking
in the literature was one of the aims of my article. One of the crucial
points at issue is whether we adopt a narrow or a wide definition of
eventualities.
2. A narrow or wide definition of eventualities?
In (1) I repeat the definition of eventualities that I advocated in my target
article (p. 279).
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(1) Davidsonian notion of eventualities:
Eventualities are particular spatiotemporal entities with functionally
integrated participants.
Under this view, eventualities are expected, among other things, to have a
location in space, and natural language expressions denoting eventualities
should therefore combine with locative modifiers. As noted above, Hig-
ginbotham, Ramchand and Dölling take the definition in (1) to be too
narrow. In particular, they reject the assumption of eventualities having
an inherent spatial dimension; cf., e.g., the alternative definition o¤ered
by Ramchand (p. 372), which I repeat in (2).
(2) Eventualities are abstract entities with constitutive participants and
with a constitutive relation to the temporal dimension.
To illustrate one line of reasoning, I quote one of Dölling’s examples (his
(1a) and (2a)); cf. Ramchand (p. 366) for similar remarks.
(3) a. * Hans wurde (gerade) in Italien 30 Jahre alt.
Hans became (at the moment) in Italy 30 years old.
b. * Hans war (gerade) in Italien 30 Jahre alt.
Hans was (at the moment) in Italy 30 years old.
Dölling observes that the verbal expression ‘to become 30 years old’ in
(3a) is obviously eventive and should therefore – on my definition in (1) –
combine with a locative modifier. Yet, this is not possible. So my account
seems to make the wrong predictions. It excludes (3b) as ungrammatical
but tolerates (3a), which, according to Dölling (p. 318), is equally devi-
ant. Dölling takes (3a) and similar data as evidence that eventualities
may lack a spatial dimension. Hence, definition (1) should be dismissed
in favour of a wider definition of eventualities along the lines of (2). Cases
like ‘becoming 30 years old’ and ‘being 30 years old’ would then belong
to a subtype of eventualities that have no location in space, which would
explain why (3a,b) are odd.
In order to assess this argument let us first see what happens if we vary
the predicate somewhat as in (4).
(4) a. Hans wurde (gerade) in der Küche
Hans became (at the moment) in the kitchen
ohnmächtig/wütend/blass/seltsam . . .
unconscious/angry /pale /strange . . .
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b. * Hans war (gerade) in der Küche
Hans was (at the moment) in the kitchen
ohnmächtig/wütend/blass/seltsam . . .
unconscious/angry /pale /strange . . .
The stative variant (4b) remains ‘‘bad’’ (in my terms: ungrammatical), but
the eventive variant (4a) is perfectly fine now, which is what my account
would predict. So, what is responsible for the deviance of (3a)? In my
view, this is an instance of a conceptual mismatch. If we choose a more
appropriate locative modifier, which fits better with the event, as in (3 0a),
the sentence recovers its grammaticality again, while the stative variant
(3 0b) still is ungrammatical.
(3 0) a. Hans wurde (gestern) im Kreise seiner Familie 90
Hans became (yesterday) in.the circle of his family 90
Jahre alt.
years old.
b. * Hans war (gestern) im Kreise seiner Familie 90 Jahre
Hans was (yesterday) in.the circle of his family 90 years
alt.
old.
Whatever the exact conditions for such conceptual matches and mis-
matches may be, they do not form part of the grammar. Thus, I would
maintain that the b-sentences above are ruled out on grammatical
grounds (due to the absence of an eventuality argument), whereas all
a-sentences are grammatically well-formed. This is as far as our linguistic
knowledge takes us – which does not preclude that cases like (3a) will be
judged as more or less anomalous on the basis of world knowledge.
Drawing the borderline between linguistic and extra-linguistic knowl-
edge is an extremely intricate and highly controversial issue indeed, and
every single case needs careful consideration. Therefore, I believe, we
should all the more look for clear linguistic diagnostics and apply them
with caution. To give an illustration, take the following quote from
Ramchand (p. 366): ‘‘given that complex dynamic events like ‘deciding’
are sometimes di‰cult to perceive, and that copular predications like ‘be-
ing on the table’ are always easy to perceive, means that the distinction
also cannot be related to some ontological di¤erence in perceptibility or
‘locatability’ in real space and time.’’
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Ramchand is right; ‘deciding’ is definitely not one of the ‘‘harmless’’
events like ‘Jones buttering a toast’ or ‘Brutus stabbing Caesar’ that al-
ways come to the Davidsonian semanticist’s mind first. And it may well
be that cases like ‘deciding’ or ‘contemplating’ require a further distinc-
tion between ordinary, concrete eventualities and somehow non-concrete,
(‘‘abstract’’) eventualities, in the same vein as there may be concrete
and abstract objects, concrete and abstract paths, etc. I do not want to
dispute this, but note that the linguistic diagnostics show clear results
even for these less easily accessible eventualities. Take, e.g., ‘contem-
plating’. As (5a) shows, the process verb can be combined with a loca-
tive modifier; while the stative variant in (5b) is ungrammatical in this
combination.
(5) a. Um Mitternacht hatte Anna im Park (über ihre Zukunft)
At midnight had Anna it.the park (her future)
nachgedacht.
contemplated.
b. * Um Mitternacht war Anna im Park nachdenklich.
At midnight was Anna in.the park contemplative.
Furthermore, the ‘‘a little bit’’-diagnostic, which I introduced in section
4.4 of the target article, yields equally clear results:
(6) a. Gestern hat Anna ein bisschen degree and
Yesterday has Anna a little bit eventive reading
nachgedacht.
contemplated.
b. Gestern war Anna ein bisschen only degree reading
Yesterday was Anna a little bit
nachdenklich.
contemplative.
While (6a) has both a degree reading and an eventive reading; (6b) only
displays the degree reading. That is, sentence (6b) cannot express that yes-
terday Anna was contemplative for a short while. Obviously, such a read-
ing would make perfect sense and thus cannot be discarded as a concep-
tual mismatch. Rather, I would maintain, it is the grammar that discards
the eventive reading in (6b) (given that the modifier selects (homoge-
neous) eventuality arguments; see the discussion in the target article).
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Finally, these results are further confirmed by the perception reports in
(7). As I readily admit in consideration of the questions that arose in the
commentaries, there appear to be many other factors involved here that
still have to be disentangled in order to make the perception verb test a
manageable and solid eventuality diagnostic.
(7) a. Gestern habe ich Anna nachdenken gesehen.
Yesterday have I Anna contemplate seen.
b. * Gestern habe ich Anna nachdenklich sein gesehen.
Yesterday have I Anna contemplative be seen.
What the sentences (5) and (6), and with some caveat (7), show is the
following. While the actual scenes they describe are similarly inaccessible
– they could be even identical – the linguistic diagnostics reveal a clear
di¤erence hinting at two di¤erent conceptualizations. These conceptu-
alizations contrast sharply wrt the presence or absence of a spatial
dimension.
On the other hand, replacing a more di‰cult state to grasp like ‘being
contemplative’ by an easily perceptible and in this sense concrete state
like Ramchand’s ‘being on the table’ or ‘being wet’ does not have any im-
pact on the outcome of our linguistic diagnostics:
(8) a. * Das Kleid war (gerade) auf der Wäscheleine nass.
The dress was (at the moment) on the clothesline wet.
b. Das Kleid war ein bisschen nass. only degree reading
The dress was a little bit wet.
The combination with an (eventuality-related) locative modifier is ruled
out in (8a), although it would make sense, i.e., there is no conceptual mis-
match at work; see the discussion of (23)–(25) in the target article. And
(8b) lacks the eventive reading of ein bisschen.
I do not see how data like (5)–(8) could be accounted for adequately in
a more liberal framework based on a broader definition of eventualities
along the lines of (2) as envisaged by Ramchand and Dölling. The basic
idea would be to conceive of D-states and K-states as di¤erent subtypes
of eventualities. Dölling (p. 320) notes: ‘‘States would divide, then, in
analogy to events into two kinds as subtypes of the category of eventual-
ities – spatial states, on the one hand, and non-spatial states, on the other
hand.’’ On this account, could there be any independent motivation for
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classifying, e.g., ‘being wet’ as a non-spatial state? And why should ein
bisschen on its eventive reading accept any kind of process arguments
but only non-spatial state arguments? Furthermore, would locative predi-
cations like to be on the table, which assign a location to the subject refer-
ent, also denote non-spatial states then (given that they behave like other
K-state expressions wrt the relevant linguistic tests)?
To my mind, the idea of postulating two kinds of states as subtypes
of the category of eventualities depending on whether they can be located
in space or not, seems rather ad hoc. A subdivision of eventualities into
events (accomplishments and achievements), processes, and states in the
spirit of Vendler (1967) is based on temporal/aspectual criteria. Why
should non-dynamic, homogeneous eventualities (i.e. states) divide fur-
ther into spatial and non-spatial subtypes? And why should expressions
referring to non-spatial states moreover exclude modification of manner
adverbs or eventive ein bisschen? This would have to be stipulated.
In the end, assuming K-states not as a subtype of eventualities but as
an alternative entity might be not as hazardous from an ontological point
of view as it appears at first. In some respects, e.g. reference, inherence of
a temporal dimension, K-states are as ordinary things as eventualities
are. It is worth pointing out in this context that Dölling’s considerations
concerning the inferential behavior of K-states lead to the conclusion that
K-state-based approaches and eventuality-based approaches basically
have the same merits and problems in handling the relevant entailment
patterns; see Dölling’s footnotes 9 and 10. In lacking an inherent spatial
dimension K-states are more abstract entities than eventualities.
3. Judging data
The issue of evaluating the empirical data properly already came up in
the above discussion of the sentences in (3) vs. (3 0). When it comes to
specify the reasons for a sentence being ‘‘bad’’, opinions may di¤er con-
siderably. A sentence’s oddness might be explained in terms of ungram-
maticality, conceptual ill-formedness, pragmatic anomaly, etc. This point
is picked up by Rothstein’s commentary. Rothstein argues that the empir-
ical data that I present for my claim that there is a clear grammatical dis-
tinction between eventuality expressions and K-state expressions are not
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solid enough. The observed di¤erences do not justify then the postulation
of di¤erent logical structures but might rather be conducive to a prag-
matic explanation.
Since it would go beyond the scope of this reply to look at each of
Rothstein’s and the other commentators’ counter-examples carefully, I
will pick out only two cases which I find particularly telling for the issue
of judging data.
Rothstein presents a number of examples suggesting that copular con-
structions, contrary to what I claim, do combine with (eventuality-
related) locative modifiers. One class of examples are her sentences (11),
which I repeat in (9).
(9) a. John is happy in the swimming pool.
b. John is lazy in Paris.
According to Rothstein, a sentence like (9a) should be analyzed as ex-
pressing that there is a state of John being happy and this state is located
in the swimming pool. This would indeed disprove my claim concerning
the incompatibility of locative modifiers with copular constructions. Yet,
I must insist that the structure behind sentences like (9) is quite di¤erent
than that envisioned by Rothstein. Furthermore, it is the syntactic struc-
ture that is di¤erent here. Rothstein’s account presupposes a syntactic
analysis according to which the adjective figures as the main predicate
and the locative PP is a VP-modifier. But there is an alternative syntactic
analysis to these sentences according to which it is the locative that builds
the main predicate and the adjective is a depictive secondary predicate.
Under this syntactic analysis (and without commitment to any particular
theory of depictives) sentence (9a) would express that there is a state of
John being in the swimming pool, and this state is temporally included
in an accompanying state of John being happy. Such an analysis of data
like (9) would leave my claim concerning locative modifiers una¤ected,
simply because no locative modification is involved. In order to account
for (9) my analysis would only need to be extended to allow K-state argu-
ments to not only be introduced into primary predications (via the cop-
ula) but also into (depictive) secondary predications; see, e.g., Dölling’s
(pp. 324–325) suggestions concerning the underlying logical structure.
This might be the right place to add a short remark on the source of the
K-state argument. This issue is discussed most explicitly by Engelberg,
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who opts for shifting the source of the state argument from the copula to
the main predicate; see Engelberg’s proposal in (19). Higginbotham and
Ramchand hold similar views. As Engelberg (p. 344) rightly observes,
my main concern was with the nature of the state argument rather than
with its source. Since up to now I haven’t seen a convincing solution for
the problem of how state arguments could be bound outside the realms of
primary and secondary predication, I prefer to stick to the more parsimo-
nious assumption. (Ramchand’s (p. 369) objection that my ‘‘nominal-
style’’ representation of adjectives obscures the di¤erence between adjec-
tives and nouns does not apply. Nouns and adjectives do not necessarily
di¤er in arity but in the status of their argument. The noun’s argument is
assigned the status of a referential argument, while the adjective’s argu-
ment is non-referential; see e.g. Bierwisch (1997).)
Let us turn back to the issue of (9). So far we have seen that there are
two possible syntactic structures for (9). The locative PP could either be a
VP-modifier or the sentence’s main predicate. So, is this a case of struc-
tural ambiguity, or is only one analysis correct? Let us have a look at
German here because word order may help us di¤erentiate the two anal-
yses. In the German counterparts to (9) the main predicate is in sentence
final position and a VP-modifier or depictive appears preverbally. The
two structural options are given in (10). Only one of them, (10b), turns
out to be grammatical. (The temporal modifier is added in order to in-
hibit frame-setting interferences; see section 4.2 of the target article.)
(10) a. * John ist (gerade) im Schwimmbad loc PP:
John is (at the moment) in.the swimmingpool VP-modifier
fröhlich.
happy.
b. John ist (gerade) fröhlich im loc PP:
John is (at the moment) happy in.the main predicate
Schwimmbad.
swimmingpool.
The German data show that there is in fact only one possible structural
analysis for the constructions at issue. The adjective must precede the
locative PP, which means that we are dealing with a locative main predi-
cate in combination with an adjectival secondary predicate. This suggests
that the English counterpart (9) is structurally unambiguous, too. I con-
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clude then that sentences like (9) do not provide counter-evidence to my
claim concerning the incompatibility of locative modifiers with copular
constructions.
The second kind of counter-example from Rothstein I want to dis-
cuss is sentence (11) (her (13)), which serves Rothstein as an illustration
of her pragmatic approach to the anomaly of event modifiers in copula
sentences.
(11) John is dangerous with a hammer.
In Rothstein’s view, copular constructions and statives denote somewhat
poor eventualities with little scope for variance. This is why manner
adverbials, instrumentals and the like show up so rarely: although gram-
matically well-formed they simply make no sense. As Rothstein notes on
p. 380, ‘‘many of the non-locative modifiers that we allow demand prop-
erties which are not normally associated with states, for example instru-
mentals are associated with agentivity. When a copula construction can
be interpreted with an agentive subject, an instrumental is acceptable.’’
So let us take a closer look at (11). I assume that Rothstein’s account of
(11) basically goes like this. The copula be introduces a referential argu-
ment for a semantically underspecified eventuality, which is compatible
with any of Vendler’s event types. Since instrumentals select for activity
arguments and given furthermore that the subject John is a potential
agent, be’s eventuality argument is narrowed down to activities. This
yields the following interpretation for sentence (11): There is an activity
of John being dangerous and a hammer is being used as an instrument
in this activity; see Rothstein (1999) for details.
First I should say that I am not sure whether this is indeed the right in-
terpretation for (11). At least the German counterpart (12) does not have
this reading but only has a conditional interpretation (pertaining to an
analysis of the instrumental as a frame-setting modifier), saying that if
John is in possession of a hammer then he is dangerous.
(12) John ist mit einem Hammer gefährlich.
John is with a hammer dangerous.
One piece of additional support for the assumption that the instrumental
is in fact a frame-setting modifier here may be gained by looking at nega-
tion; cf. the discussion in section 4.2 of the target article. The sentential
negation of (12) yields (13a) with the instrumental being outside the scope
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of negation. The reverse order (13b) expresses only constituent negation
of the instrumental.
(13) a. John ist mit einem Hammer nicht gefährlich.
John is with a hammer not dangerous.
b. John ist nicht mit einem Hammer gefährlich
John is not with a hammer dangerous
(. . . sondern mit einem Messer).
(. . . but with a knife).
So, at least the German counterparts of (11) cannot serve as illustrations
for an activity interpretation of copula sentences. Nevertheless I agree
with Rothstein that such interpretations may show up. In my view, a bet-
ter candidate would be (14).
(14) John ist mit einem Hammer auf dem Dach.
John is with a hammer on the roof.
This sentence may in fact have an activity interpretation according to
which there is an eventuality of John doing something with a hammer,
and this activity is located on the roof. The crucial question is: How do
we reach at this interpretation? While Rothstein would take cases like
(14) to be an instance of semantic underspecification, I assume that they
involve a non-compositional operation of event coercion. More specifi-
cally, my explanation goes like this; see Maienborn (2003a, b) for details.
Sentences like (14) are strictly speaking ungrammatical because the copu-
lar construction does not meet the sortal requirements of the instrumen-
tal. Nevertheless, given our ability to associate with states like ‘being on
the roof ’ characteristic activities, like, e.g., ‘repairing the roof ’, such sen-
tences may be ‘‘rescued’’ by interpolating a suitable eventuality argument.
Once introduced, this argument may serve as the target for the adverbial’s
meaning contribution. That is, under certain pragmatic conditions the
sortal clash between an event modifier and a K-state expression may be
resolved via a non-compositional operation by which an appropriate
eventuality argument is inserted into the logical structure; see e.g. Egg
(2001) for a formal treatment of coercion. (Let me note in passing that I
consider coercion to be a phenomenon located at the interface between
the linguistic and the conceptual system, whereas Higginbotham seems
to assume that – if existent at all – coercion should be seen as part of the
linguistic system, see his footnote 4.)
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If we compare Rothstein’s approach to sentences like (14) with mine it
is easy to see that they have a considerable amount in common. The main
point of divergence is whether assuming the activity argument is a regular
part of the interpretation process in terms of a resolved semantic under-
specification, or whether it is part of an irregular rescue-operation for a
literally ungrammatical sentence.
In view of all the factors involved here, many of them still remaining
rather mysterious, we are probably not in the position to decide this issue
yet. So, I just want to give one piece of data that seems to be problematic
for the underspecification account. We would expect on this account that
a sentence like (14) is a regular activity sentence. Thus, it should behave
like other activity sentences in the relevant respects. One suitable diagnos-
tic for testing this prediction is anaphoric reference with geschehen (‘to
happen’); see the discussion of (11)–(13) in the target article. While event
and process (including activity) arguments can be resumed with the help
of this proform, state arguments cannot. Now, as (15) shows, our sample
sentence does not pass this test. A true activity expression is given in (16)
for comparison.
(15) John war mit einem Hammer auf dem Dach.
John was with a hammer on the roof.
* Das geschah während . . .
This happened while . . .
(16) John arbeitete mit einem Hammer auf dem Dach.
John worked with a hammer on the roof.
Das geschah während . . .
This happened while . . .
Despite its activity (re-)interpretation, sentence (14) still behaves like a
state sentence. This is unexpected under an underspecification account.
Thus (15) seems to fit better with my coercion account, according to
which the integration of the instrumental is only due to a local rescue
operation.
Needless to say that the issue is far from being settled. I therefore re-
peat: Comments are very welcome!
Humboldt University Berlin
c.maienborn@rz.hu-berlin.de
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